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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What can citizens do when their governments are nonresponsive 
or ineffective, and what can a good government or politician do to in-
crease the chances that it will serve all its citizens well? The conven-
tional answers to these questions are reflected in constitutions and in 
increasingly complex statutory and judge-made schemes. Lawyers 
might focus on opportunities for litigating against governments, large 
and small, while political scientists and public-choice-minded aca-
demic lawyers are drawn to thoughts of the political checks that keep 
governments in line. Political leaders impress us when they set our 
sights on the moon and then get us there on schedule. They frustrate 
us when we look closer to our ghettos, and see mortality, crime, and 
literacy rates that appall us even in the face of enormous public ex-
penditures. My aim here is not to explain the combinations of success 
and failure that we find but rather to explore the idea of improving 
performance with modest incentives.1 I explore the possibility that a 
government decisionmaker, or the majority coalition that is behind it, 
might be motivated by the requirement that it pay for failure.  
 The strategy is one of offering a guarantee to citizens, or quasi-
warranty, by which I mean some sort of payment by the service pro-
vider, in this case the government, so that the government has an 
economic incentive to perform well. Much as we might think of com-
mercial warranties as encouraging private firms to make good prod-
ucts if only to avoid liability under a warranty, so too public warran-
ties might constitute useful incentives. The analogy is highly imper-
fect. The government is not a person or firm with clear motives; com-
                                                                                                                      
 * Dean and William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law 
School. This article is a revised and expanded version of the Mason Ladd Lecture delivered 
at the Florida State University College of Law in February 2003. I am grateful for the op-
portunity and conversations enjoyed there, and for the generous spirit and intellectual en-
ergy that was conveyed by the Dean, faculty, students, and staff.  
 1. Nor is my aim to argue for privatization. There are, of course, political hurdles to 
privatization, as we see with school voucher experiments, and the effects of privatization 
are likely to depend on the government service that is involved. In any event, I put privati-
zation to one side here and ask how that which is done poorly by governments might be 
improved. I do introduce an element of privatization below with the suggestion that private 
parties might bid for warranty payments. See infra text p. 421 following note 11.  
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mercial warranties offer consumers insurance and, as we will see, 
these citizen warranties will succeed only by offering little or no in-
surance. But much as commercial warranties can combine with firms’ 
reputational interests to improve performance, so too citizen warran-
ties might reinforce political checks.  
 Part II begins with the question of why political checks might 
fail, so that governments might repeatedly underperform in some ar-
eas. Part III explores the form a citizen warranty might take. The fo-
cus is on substandard schools, but it could just as well be directed at 
crime or a number of other areas of government involvement. The 
discussion explores a warranty that extracts resources from the un-
derperforming government unit, but it also considers a version in 
which the economic incentive is maintained at no long-run cost to the 
taxpayers. Part IV then turns to the positive question of why warran-
ties might be a sensible approach when even private markets do not 
generally offer warranties for services. Some discussion of the prod-
uct-service distinction is for this reason relevant. Part V concludes. 
II.   THE 60/40 PROBLEM OF A REPEATEDLY UNDERSERVED MINORITY 
 The focus here is on poorly performing local governments. In 
principle, citizen warranties could be applied to average governments 
and to state and federal governments, but the easiest illustrations 
concern patently poor results for a government facing nearby com-
petitors. As we will see, the idea advanced here might be better ap-
plied to governments that face no competition. And it might be an ef-
fective means of improving upon even very good government per-
formance. But I leave such thoughts and illustrations for future 
work. 
 Consider, by way of a central example, a failing public school or 
set of such schools under the control of a local government. It is not 
uncommon to find a city with some good neighborhood schools and a 
number of very poor schools. These may be schools where half the 
students are reading two or more years below grade level. There are 
many measures of school performance. We might wish to take expen-
diture levels into account, although these are sometimes difficult to 
observe on a school-by-school basis. The problem of poor public 
schools is of course an enormous social concern. Underperforming 
schools doom students who live in the attached neighborhoods unless 
they have truly unusual parents, are inspired by a remarkable 
teacher, have the means to escape the system and go to a good pri-
vate school, or are unusually self-directed and talented. Their misfor-
tune presages a grave social cost in the future. 
 What explains the persistent underperformance of many such 
schools? Simplistic positive political theory imagines a market for 
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politicians in which voters will rise up and eliminate political repre-
sentatives who do not serve them well.2 If the schools are absorbing 
hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, and the schools are much 
worse than private alternatives or public schools in other areas, then 
the taxpayer-voters will bring on new politicians in short order. Al-
ternatively, aspiring politicians will point to the underperforming 
schools and encourage voters to make room for new leadership.  
 It is useful to compare a malfunctioning public school system 
where there are, say, twenty failing schools, with a poor traffic sys-
tem where commuting times are unusually high, traffic signals mal-
function, and so forth. At one level, it is much easier to explain the 
frustrating traffic situation. Dispersed voters might face a collective 
action problem in gaining political attention; they may not be sure 
that their elected leaders can do much about the problem; and politi-
cians will survive because of their success in providing other services 
well and in improving selected subsets of the traffic problem. The re-
turn to present-day politicians from marginally improving traffic flow 
might be low. Schools, on the other hand, absorb enormous resources 
of the directly observable kind, are amenable to comparison with 
other school systems, are more likely to affect local property values, 
and more.  
 It may be useful to emphasize the puzzle of failing schools. It 
might not be a failure of the political market if a jurisdiction chose to 
spend very little on its schools, but many of the school systems we 
observe spend a great deal and perform very poorly.3 A political ma-
jority might simply decide to spend little on schools (despite evidence 
that investments in education are worthwhile). The apparent puzzle 
is that many jurisdictions spend high and attain low, so to speak, at 
least in some schools. Moreover, these failures are highly observable. 
Mobile families exit these schools in favor of private alternatives or 
other neighborhoods (or jurisdictions) with better services.  
                                                                                                                      
 2. WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE PO-
LITICAL THEORY (David Easton ed., 1973). 
 3. In Fiscal Year 2002, Chicago Public Schools’ operating expenditures were $8,482 
per student. Chicago Public Schools, CPS at a Glance, at http://www.cps.k12.il.us/ 
ataglance.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003). Per capita expenditures in the country’s largest 
school districts went as high as $11,040 (though they can run twice that in smaller, ambi-
tious jurisdictions) and averaged $6,278. National Center for Education Statistics, Charac-
teristics of the 100 Largest Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts in the 
United States: 2000-2001, at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/100_largest/table_10_1.asp (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2003). These are, of course, substantial sums, and they do not include in-
vestments in physical facilities. Tuitions for elite private schools are greater than these 
amounts, but many private schools spend less. To be sure, private schools may not offer 
special education and other costly programs; at the same time, some private schools offer 
programs and activities that public schools do not. My aim here is not to enter the fray 
over the efficiency of public schools but rather to set the stage for thinking about systems 
with dramatically varying performance. 
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 Nor should we be too quick to believe that the exit of some stu-
dents causes a downward spiral that dooms a school. It is likely true 
that the departure of a good student imposes a cost, as it were, on 
those students that remain, but it is also true that in many school 
systems each departure leaves the remaining students with more re-
sources per student. The idea is that with substantial fixed costs in 
facilities and the like, departures provide a windfall to the public sys-
tem and its remaining students. Put differently, if 250 students enter 
a public school district or school, we are likely to bemoan the burden 
on the system in terms of larger class sizes and the like. At the same 
time, if 250 students depart for the private sector, we are likely to 
sympathize with the public schools because of the new, perhaps infe-
rior mix of students or the reduced revenue that comes because of 
some per-student allocation of funds. It is unlikely that these two re-
actions are both correct. Short-term transitional difficulties aside, if 
contraction is bad, then expansion is probably good news, or the other 
way around. Our generous reactions to public school underperfor-
mance likely reflect wishful thinking and the perception that bad 
publicity will hasten the exit of mobile students.  
 Similar observations might be made with regard to crime fight-
ing, street maintenance, and a variety of other public services. Crime 
rates are relatively high in some neighborhoods and in some jurisdic-
tions, and yet we do not have really good explanations for the vari-
ance in crime rates. We are quick to guess that social and cultural 
factors explain the rates we experience, but it is hardly radical to 
suggest that there may be an underlying lack of political will. Crime 
rates are low in many neighborhoods that border high crime areas. 
There are pockets of affluence and low crime rates in all major cities 
with high crime rates nearby, and yet the resources spent on private 
police forces are modest compared to the enormous expenditures on 
public policing. It seems likely that more motivated politicians could 
re-deploy resources or eliminate corruption or take other steps to 
fight crime more efficiently. 
 I have tried to allude to a political problem that might explain se-
rious inefficiencies in the public sector. It is one that views the 
school-traffic comparison from a different perspective and suggests 
that some politicians might be more motivated to care about traffic 
than about schools. I refer to the fact that political survival depends 
only, or even at most, on a majority of the electorate. An optimistic 
view of politics imagines shifting coalitions, so that everyone has po-
litical power. Today’s loser in a 51-49 vote can make deals with some 
members of the majority so that a new majority emerges, and no one 
is powerless.4 Today’s loser can easily be tomorrow’s political winner.  
                                                                                                                      
 4. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). 
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 But we are familiar with the idea that some voters or groups of 
voters might be regular losers. Our legal system or general culture 
accepts the likelihood of discrete and insular minorities that some-
how lose too often or with whom other groups are unwilling to forge 
alliances. Constitutional protections are afforded to such groups.5 
There is no reason to think that the idea of repeat losers is limited to 
racial minorities. It is plausible that geographic and other factors can 
make other, unrecognized groups into regular losers. Clever politi-
cians also play some role. I do not mean to rush to the conclusion that 
a politically astute mayor or other politician with control over local 
schools would thrive by appealing to 51% of the electorate and—or 
by—exploiting the other 49%. It is too risky inasmuch as coalitions 
can shift, and the 49% can and will find allies from amongst the 51%. 
They can pay these parties well to join their new winning coalition. 
 But it may well be that in some jurisdictions it is an excellent 
strategy for a politician to favor something on the order of 60% or 
70% of the population at the expense of the rest. I will call this the 
60/40 problem, and by this I mean that rather than serving the entire 
population and rather than being responsive to all voters either out 
of a sense of moral obligation, constitutional fidelity, or mere fear of 
shifting coalitions, a political system might come to exploit 40% in 
order to benefit 60%.  
 This argument is akin to Buchanan and Tullock’s famous idea re-
garding the imposition of “external costs” on a minority.6 It is not 
necessary that the 60 exploit the 40, imposing external costs along 
the way, for it is bad enough if the 60 and their representatives are 
simply indifferent to the well being of the minority. The problem is 
that a politician might do just fine (or even better) by caring for 60% 
of the schools (or neighborhoods) and allowing 40% to fail. The cost of 
poor education is externalized on to the underserved students as well 
as society at large; little of the cost falls on the local jurisdiction. Citi-
zens who are thus underserved, and who care about this, and are 
able to do something about their situations may move to better 
schools or even to jurisdictions were they can enjoy the status and 
services due the majority. But many residents will be left behind and, 
even if some do not care much about education, the society as a whole 
loses because good education is patently valuable as a social matter. 
To add insult to injury, if the residents left behind do not vote or are 
indifferent, the politician’s strategy will seem all the more clever 
(though not socially desirable).  
                                                                                                                      
 5. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1673-87 (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing a model of constitutional argument based on structural considerations). 
 6. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63-91 (1962). 
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 The 60/40 problem is a serious redistributive problem, and per-
haps one of initial rent-seeking as well,7 but it is also a problem of 
grave misallocation of resources. At one level, this is obvious. Con-
tinuing with the example of public schools, education is an important 
investment, and it is socially inefficient to have thousands of children 
mature into illiteracy and, more generally, into life patterns that fail 
to take advantage of their productive potential. The other level is 
somewhat less apparent. It is that politicians and the majority coali-
tion will tend to push more goods into the public sector than is so-
cially efficient. True public goods are efficiently provided by govern-
ment because there is joint consumption and it is difficult to exclude 
users. If we are to have national defense, for example, it must almost 
surely be provided by the public sector—or at least the public sector 
must decide on the level of production, even if it chooses to contract 
out some of this production.  
 It might be noted in passing that pure public goods could also suf-
fer from the 60/40 problem. The decisionmaker might appeal to the 
preferences of the majority while ignoring those of the minority. 
Thus, 60% of the population might value a manned mission to Mars, 
and so a government that goes to Mars may well be using resources 
that would be better spent on something else. Ninety percent of the 
population might strongly prefer foreign aid over lower taxation and 
the retention of private resources, while 60% very strongly prefer the 
Mars mission. Yet the government might choose the latter even 
though the former is probably to be preferred under most philosophi-
cal theories. More generally, the government might simply provide 
goods that the 60% desire, but not enough to want if charged the true 
price per person. Thus, imagine a local government that provides 
fireworks displays, with no possibility of excluding viewers, where 
there are 1000 local residents. If 600 of them would pay $10 for the 
display and the display costs, say $5000, then the provision of this 
public good (out of the public fisc) is a redistributive decision. The 
600 would have paid for the good, but now all 1000 pay $5 each (if we 
can imagine a simple tax system and ignore the inefficiencies it 
might bring about). The problem is that the town might provide the 
display even where the 600 would only have paid $8 each. The public 
good is oversupplied because part of it can be charged to the 40%. 
The problem is much worse if a tax system can be devised that taxes 
the 40% and not the 60%. 
 For the most part, however, serious misallocation problems will 
be avoided if the government limits itself to the business of providing 
                                                                                                                      
 7. The problem will be one of groups seeking to position themselves or to draw politi-
cal boundaries so as to enjoy the 60/40 situation. The process of seeking this state of affairs 
is itself wasteful.  
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true public goods, where there is no option of charging user fees. 
Where pure public goods are concerned, and where there are legal 
constraints that prevent disproportionate taxes on the minority, the 
60/40 problem is limited to cases where the ruling coalition’s tastes 
are different from the minority’s. But where the government can pro-
vide other goods, the 60/40 problem is much more common because 
even when preferences are uniform (or distributed in a variety of 
ways across the majority and across the minority), the decisionmaker 
can favor the majority simply by providing goods unequally or by en-
forcing rights unequally. I should add, quickly and emphatically, that 
it is not my aim here to argue that government should be limited to 
pure public goods. There are good arguments for government in-
volvement in education and in health care and in many other areas, 
especially where there is some competition from the private sector or 
from other government units. The point here is simply that as gov-
ernments broaden their mandates beyond traditional public goods, 
the scope of the 60/40 problem grows.  
 This focus on the 60/40 problem draws attention to the claim that 
the 40 might form a set of recurring losers. The constant question, of 
course, is how often this is plausible, so that the put-upon minority 
does not form new coalitions and escape its disadvantaged status. On 
the flip side, the question is why enterprising politicians do not ap-
peal to new majorities, unseating incumbent politicians in the proc-
ess, by rescuing the losers of the 60/40 problem in a way that builds 
an alliance between these losers and some subset of the old majority 
coalition. Thus, where the 600 enjoy fireworks worth $4800 but (inef-
ficiently) made possible by a tax of $5 on each of 1000 citizens, the 
aspiring politician has an attractive promise to make to attract sup-
porters. The 400 can be offered a lower tax of $1, rather than the old 
$5, and the aspiring politician can promise to take the $1000 in reve-
nue and spend it on a project that appeals only to a subset of 200 citi-
zens drawn away from the old majority. These 200 swing voters 
would give up the benefits of fireworks worth $8 to them but costing 
only $5 each, in return for paying $1 in tax and receiving a per-capita 
benefit of, say, $5 (the $1000 divided among the 200 voters). If we 
think deals like this one are easy to fashion and reliably carried out, 
then the political market works and the 60/40 problem will disap-
pear. And yet, a quick look around our cities and in various other 
segments of society suggests that this market does not always work. 
Some groups seem to be left out. It may be that political promises are 
seen as unreliable; that some parents do not sufficiently take their 
children’s futures into account; that some voters do not trust politi-
cians or government-run institutions; and that transaction costs are 
high.  
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 In any event, my focus here is on such things as primary and sec-
ondary public schools and on violent crime rates, and in both these 
contexts there can be little doubt but that there are many locales 
where higher literacy (or educational attainment) rates or lower 
crime rates would yield enormous social gains. The suggestion is that 
we look at problems that are very serious, where there is widespread 
agreement that improvement would yield substantial gains to the 
citizens directly involved as well as to the society at large, and where 
it is easy to identify some sort of political failure. My claim is not that 
with some sort of citizen warranty we can get more socially efficient 
fireworks displays. It is that with relatively modest—but dramatic—
experiments we might be able to break out of equilibria where we are 
almost surely wasting billions of dollars (and many lives) that need 
not be lost. 
 An important objection to the idea advanced here is that if there 
is indeed a 60/40 problem, then it cannot be solved by a suggestion 
that itself requires a government program—unless it is somehow im-
posed by courts or by the electorate in some sort of constitutional 
moment, which seems most unlikely. The majority will not agree to a 
plan that ends its advantage, so to speak. If the 60 can exploit or ig-
nore the 40, and keep it that way for some time, then it seems in-
credible that the 60 would suddenly agree to some socially minded so-
lution to a problem that is of their own making and advantage. 
 There are several responses to this objection. First, it is possible 
that a government would agree to a solution, or warranty plan, that 
only took effect at some point in the future. A government may be 
uncertain as to its own expected longevity, and there may be political 
gain in promising a future experiment, and then also substantial po-
litical costs to anyone who tries to abort the experiment. Second, the 
warranty idea may permit ambitious, insurgent politicians to formu-
late a platform for their own election. These players may have trou-
ble settling on an offer, or potential coalition, to break the ruling ma-
jority, but the warranty might offer a (seemingly) neutral plan that 
allows many voters to think they will be better off with change.  
 Third on this non-exhaustive list is the possibility that the judici-
ary will bring about citizen warranties where government services 
are seriously substandard. There are of course occasional malpractice 
and breach of contract suits brought against governments.8 But 
                                                                                                                      
 8. Courts have traditionally been resistant to these types of suits. In what appears to 
be the first decision regarding a tort cause of action, a California court rejected a theory of 
educational malpractice based on the difficulty of establishing any breach of duty and for 
public policy reasons, specifically that imposing liability would do more harm than good to 
an already beleaguered school district. Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 
854 (1976) (rejecting malpractice theory in case brought on behalf of functionally illiterate 
graduate). Later courts agreed with this rationale. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free 
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nearly all of these suits fail.9 Plaintiffs might complain if, for exam-
ple, they are illiterate after twelve years of government-provided 
schooling, but governments can assert a sovereign immunity defense 
or can point to other products of the educational system by way of 
blaming the plaintiff.10 There are other defenses as well. The spirit of 
the defense has much to do with measurement problems. Much as 
doctors might lose suits after specific malpractice events but rarely if 
ever lose simply because a patient is not well, so too governments are 
fairly safe in court when plaintiffs simply point to their own disap-
pointment with the end product. Among other things, it is difficult to 
show any causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury, if it is that, 
and the government’s negligence, if it is that. Even where the plain-
tiffs can point to a specific decision, such as inadequate reading in-
struction, poor facilities, or poor diagnostics, it is easy for the gov-
ernment to claim that there is no industry standard for the best way 
to teach reading or the best way to teach math to a struggling stu-
dent, and so forth. Nor is a plaintiff likely to find it easy to point to 
any one of these decisions (or more than one) and convince a court 
that the government’s decision or entire educational system caused 
the plaintiff’s poor state.  
 Then there are problems in fashioning remedies. Courts are 
unlikely to grant much structural relief because they are not in the 
business of running schools and because there is indeed little consen-
sus as to how exactly to run schools. Meanwhile, monetary remedies 
are difficult to fashion or at least so imperfect as to be troubling. Suc-
                                                                                                                      
Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (regarding the entertainment of such claims of 
“educational malpractice” as poor public policy). Breach of contract actions generally in-
volve private educators and have been found to be deficient because of a lack of any specific 
promise and breach detailed in the complaint. See Cavaliere v. Duff’s Bus. Inst., 605 A.2d 
397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding against plaintiff who attended course for court report-
ers); Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d 155 (Idaho 1986) (finding against plaintiff who 
was disappointed with auto repair course). The Massachusetts Supreme Court did find for 
a plaintiff on a theory of educational malpractice. That holding, though, was based specifi-
cally on language in the Massachusetts Constitution and likely its reasoning would not ap-
ply elsewhere. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993) (finding for illiterate plaintiffs who sought restitution). Specifically, the Court inter-
preted Part II, clause 5, section 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution, “it shall be the duty of 
the legislatures and magistrates . . . to cherish . . . public schools,” to establish a duty to 
ensure that the public schools achieve their object and educate the people. Id. at 517. By 
way of comparison, the Florida Constitution’s passage on education does not instruct the 
legislature to cherish anything, but rather “to make adequate provision for the education of 
all children.”  FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). Reasonable courts could interpret these constitu-
tional provisions differently, and perhaps the Massachusetts experience is of little predic-
tive value when it comes to Florida, other states, or even differently constituted courts in 
Massachusetts.   
 9. See cases cited and discussion supra note 8. 
 10. Conventionally, plaintiffs will need to show a duty owed, a breach of duty, dam-
ages, and proximate cause.  The last requirement on its own is probably the most difficult 
to prove because defendants can say that failure is the product of many causes, including 
home environment, medical problems, and much more. 
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cessful plaintiffs might, under some kind of restitution theory, be 
awarded the cost of private school tuition or perhaps the per-student 
subsidy that the underperforming school received from the state or 
school board. But these sorts of funds might discourage the very law-
yers that courts are, by assumption, seeking to encourage or at least 
align themselves with. 
 I do not intend to argue here or elsewhere that courts ought to 
impose (what I will call) citizen warranties, or quasi-warranties, on 
governments. Nor do I think they will. But it is plausible that, in the 
face of liability threats from courts, governments will on their own 
try offering warranties. It is even possible that some sort of warranty 
scheme, once explained, could be offered by one party or other as a 
structural or injunctive remedy. And if, for example, warranties come 
into being because governments fear monetary liability, then it would 
be misleading to say that courts had nothing to do with the birth or 
imposition of these warranties. 
III.   STRUCTURING THE WARRANTY 
 The idea advanced here is meant to stimulate some thought 
rather than serve as a blueprint for a particular political or social 
plan. Still, it is useful to set out more specifically what a citizen war-
ranty might look like. The notion, as already explained, is to choose 
something that a government seems to do poorly and then structure 
an economic incentive and promise to see if citizens might be better 
served. Consider three examples in a kind of side-by-side comparison: 
street maintenance, educational quality, and crime fighting. In all 
these areas we can defend the proposition that some governments 
appear to shortchange subsets of constituents in repeat fashion. It is 
in this sense that political markets can be said to fail.  
 What if a government offered a warranty that streets would be 
pot-hole free, and that any shortfalls in service would be remedied 
within three days? And what, if similarly, a government promised 
some substantial payment to students who tested far below grade 
level or to victims of violent crime? One problem with the pot-hole 
idea is that no remedy has been stated for breaking the promise. If 
the government offers a payment to the nearest property owner or to 
persons living within a certain distance of a pot-hole exceeding some 
specified size, there is the moral hazard problem that property own-
ers might actually create or expand holes in order to qualify for the 
payment. The same might be true in the education and crime exam-
ples, where it is plausible that some selfish or desperate profit maxi-
mizers (so to speak) will use or fake educational failure or crime af-
fecting their families in order to receive monetary rewards. People 
may or may not be sensitive to economic incentives when it comes to 
2004]                          CITIZEN WARRANTIES 419 
 
these things, but it seems reckless to offer incentives that might dis-
courage crime prevention or deter families from encouraging their 
children to read and to use available tutoring services and so forth. 
 There are, roughly speaking, three ways of dealing with these 
moral hazard problems. One is to be careful to make payments that 
are low enough so as not to tempt victims or those around them. A 
moment’s thought will show that this is not easy to do in these set-
tings. The second is to impose very harsh penalties on anyone who 
creates accidents or losses in order to generate promised payments. 
The usual problem with this approach is that enforcement is imper-
fect. The third is to develop a remedy, even for something structured 
in the form of a warranty of sorts, that does not reward persons who 
could possibly be in a position to influence the rate of loss. This last 
strategy is in fact the one I pursue below. 
 Note that the moral hazard problem is not avoided by simply pri-
vatizing these government functions, though it is possible that a gov-
ernment will be better at monitoring a private contractor than at 
providing a service itself. Thus, a newly elected government might 
respond to complaints about poor street maintenance by contracting 
out for private firms to pave roads and fill holes. In turn, the private 
company might owe damages or otherwise be evaluated by the num-
ber of unfilled holes. But the private firm will be unwilling to do this 
to the extent that the government might be tempted to create pot-
holes in order to receive payments under the terms of the contract. Of 
course, it is possible that the government can induce other private 
firms to monitor the firm that is awarded a contract, perhaps because 
once the market is opened up, various firms will compete for the gov-
ernment contract. Alternatively, the government might award sev-
eral contracts to different private firms and then reward the firms by 
ranking the performance of these parties. But it is not my intention 
here to turn a discussion of government-offered warranties into one 
of privatization: the point is simply that a monetary remedy for sub-
par performance raises a moral hazard danger that is not avoided 
simply through privatization.  
 A warranty, which is to say a promise and requirement to pay 
when a product or service does not meet specified standards, can 
compensate buyers (to be sure), but the focus here is on the expecta-
tion that encourages the provider to perform well. Warranties are 
like liability rules in this sense, as they aim to internalize costs and 
benefits in one party. Politicians gain from promising and providing 
services to the electorate, or even to a portion of it, and this pre-
sumably encourages them to make more promises or to provide good 
and desired services. Similarly, if the service is poor or if promises 
are broken or if things that ought to be supplied to all citizens are 
only given to some, politicians ought to feel some of this burden in 
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order to discourage this sort of tactic. Parties are expected to take the 
implications of what they do more seriously if made to pay for conse-
quences. To be sure, when organizations (including governments) are 
made to pay, there is room to doubt the internalization logic because 
there are agency problems and other barriers between the expected 
payments and that which motivates the actors on the front line who 
act in the name of the firm or government. And yet there is no doubt 
that monetary burdens will eventually have an impact on govern-
mental actions, either because officials care about their budgets or 
because news of the required payments generates political pressure 
on politicians. 
 The idea, then, is that a government that may not fear political 
checks, perhaps because of the 60/40 problem, might better respond 
to economic incentives. It may be that interest groups seeking to 
make claims on government revenues will encourage the government 
not to waste resources on warranty payments, or it may simply be 
that politicians will see no gain in making warranty payments and 
would prefer to save resources for projects of their own choosing. Ei-
ther way, the notion is that a government that pays for losses suf-
fered where there are high crime rates, or indeed for all crime, might 
do a superior job at fighting crime, or budgeting the resources neces-
sary to do so. And a government might do a better job with respect to 
education if it paid something when some of its schools were doing 
poorly. The thought here is that some governments are very sensitive 
to crime and to educational performance and to other matters when 
troubles beset some citizens or some neighborhoods, but not when 
they affect others. Economic incentives might solve the 60/40 prob-
lem. 
 For purposes of this exercise I will set out one possible plan, or 
thought experiment. Imagine a government warranty that was built 
around standardized tests taken by high school graduates. The school 
board or local government might promise that any school with more 
than 10% of the students receiving a failing score on a given exam or 
more than X percent not able to be admitted to a standard college 
program would trigger a warranty payment. The payment might be 
$10,000 for every student above the 10% trigger. However, the money 
would not go to these students but (for example) to a scholarship 
fund at the local state university earmarked for students from this 
school district.  
 We might improve on the plan (and save budgetary resources) by 
choosing a number of third parties, such as universities—but perhaps 
completely unrelated for-profit firms—and offering them the oppor-
tunity to bid for the right to receive these warranty payments. Each 
year these outsiders would assess the government’s likely liability 
under its own warranty plan and would then pay to the government 
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an amount less than this expected revenue. The government could 
use this money for education or other purposes, but it would retain 
the economic incentive to perform well and to minimize or completely 
avoid warranty payments.  
 This is hardly the place to insist on one form of warranty scheme 
over another, with the one just sketched fairly described as a form of 
insurance, following Porat and Cooter’s work on this subject in con-
tract law.11 But it should be noted that, from a public choice perspec-
tive, the third-party bidders will likely make the plan more attractive 
politically (as it need not cost the jurisdiction money), but less attrac-
tive functionally. The disadvantage is that decisionmakers might not 
be terribly pressured by a scheme that did not impose net costs. It is 
true that improving schools would lead to lower payments (and leave 
the system with more money in hand for present projects), but then 
this improvement would reduce the revenue from bidders in the next 
time period. For now, I simply leave open the possibility that this 
warranty system could be a revenue neutral scheme in the long run. 
 This plan resembles a warranty in requiring payment from the 
party most entrusted with performance. On the other hand, a war-
ranty would normally make a disappointed consumer whole, while 
this scheme gives the money to other deserving parties and not to the 
failed consumer. The point of such a quasi-warranty is to avoid the 
moral hazard problem. Indeed, we might want to extract payment 
from the families of failing students in order to get them to exert 
more effort on or on behalf of their children, but given the variety of 
causes of failure such a step seems too harsh and perhaps counter-
productive. 
 The $10,000 figure is obviously illustrative. One might look for a 
compensatory figure, but again the idea is not to compensate the 
failed students. The scheme might be restitutionary and look to the 
resources that the governmental unit should have but did not expend 
on behalf of these failing students. The schools in question might 
simply pay out the funds normally received by them on a per-student 
basis, as a kind of unjust enrichment payment. The figure could also 
be remedial, though the moral hazard problem arises if we earmark 
the money for remedial educational programs. 
 As a political matter, the best strategy might be to earmark some 
money for the failing students, but require that they actually spend 
the money on remedial or vocational education, and give the rest to a 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (Univ. of Chicago Law 
Sch., John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 193, 2d series, 2003) at http:// 
www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) and (Univ. of Cal. at 
Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 134, 2003) at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=428162 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).  
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third party (like the university scholarship program) that is unlikely 
to be able to influence the failure rate at the local high schools. 
Again, the third party could bid for the right to this revenue, and if 
this insurance-quasi-warranty version is the one used, then the third 
party could even be an insurance company or other profit-oriented 
firm. Of course, if there is a danger that school officials or teachers 
will prefer to generate failing students in order to enjoy the increased 
funding for state university scholarships, then the beneficiary must 
be yet further removed from the source of the problem. In an extreme 
case, the money paid out by failing schools in one state could go to 
programs in another state under some sort of reciprocal agreement. 
 This strategy can be varied according to circumstances and even 
according to social problem. In the case of violent crime, for example, 
Kyle Logue and I have suggested that a government could or perhaps 
should make payments to third parties when the violent crime rate 
was much worse than average—but that small amounts would be 
paid to victims with the bulk of the payments going to relatively re-
mote charities.12 It should be noted that in the crime context, the re-
duction in payments to the victims surely makes the system as a 
whole politically less attractive. In contrast, it is plausible if ironic 
that, in the educational context, payments to third parties (like col-
lege scholarship programs) might make the warranty plan more po-
litically viable. Selfish voters will most prefer that their government 
not owe money: they can hardly count on being beneficiaries of the 
scholarship program. But they might favor the warranty in the first 
place because of the possibility that the scholarships will go to people 
like them. 
 The warranty idea can extend of course to street maintenance, 
where very substandard street maintenance might trigger payments 
to third parties. But in this context the measurement task is some-
what more difficult. Pot-holes per mile would not do as a measure be-
cause of the hazard that the government would allow large pot-holes 
to grow in the interest of reducing the absolute number of holes. 
Other measures are difficult to carry out. An outside monitor might 
rank street maintenance programs, perhaps including snow removal, 
but as we resort to such measures we will often be inclined to revert 
to public programs with a political check or to fuller privatization—
with its own measurement problems, as discussed earlier.  
 The warranty idea could also be extended to purer public goods. 
Thus, if the government aims to keep a space station aloft or to send 
a human to Mars failure could be well-specified and then trigger a 
quasi-warranty payment to some program that does not benefit any-
                                                                                                                      
 12. See Saul Levmore & Kyle Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2003). 
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one in a position to influence the success or failure of the space pro-
gram. One reason to draw the line between education and space is 
because the latter is much in the public eye and the political check is 
more potent. But another, more systemic, reason to think that the po-
litical check is more robust in one case than in the other is that when 
a space program fails, the majority that might have initially sup-
ported it is disappointed and inclined to look carefully at its political 
representatives. In contrast, when some schools fail, there may be lit-
tle political pressure brought to bear by the majority whose own 
schools are just fine. The 60/40 problem is not present with respect to 
pure public goods. The majority may of course choose programs that 
are of little value to the minority, as discussed earlier, but at least 
the majority will care about the government’s performance. In con-
trast, for most other government provided goods, not only may the 
majority choose what to provide in a self-serving fashion, but also the 
majority may not care about substandard services provided to the 
minority. 
IV.   THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
 I have sketched the idea of public warranties—where majorities 
are suspect—and I leave for another effort the question of whether 
there is any limit to these warranties or whether they are best 
thought of as legislative or judicial tools. I also leave for another dis-
cussion one glaring weakness of the warranty idea, namely that we 
should be skeptical of such warranties inasmuch as private firms 
that offer similar goods do not offer warranties. But because this 
question is an especially interesting one, it is useful to sketch it—and 
some possible responses—here.  
 One way to criticize these citizen warranties is to point out that it 
is not as if the government is marketing a defective product or even a 
lemon of a product. Instead, the government is offering services and 
it is surely noteworthy that private firms that offer similar services 
do not generally, if ever, offer warranties. Thus, there are private se-
curity companies that operate alongside or in the shadow of police 
departments, and they do not offer damages or warranties in the 
event that their presence fails to deter crime or even in the event 
that with their guards present the customer experiences a much 
higher than average crime rate. Nor do private schools offer warran-
ties in the event that its students fail to pass or do well on state ex-
ams. One can imagine private schools promising that graduates will 
be admitted to good colleges or high schools, but none seem to make 
such promises. The moral hazard problem is somewhat limited be-
cause tuition is a formidable entry requirement, and its payment re-
flects the student’s (or family’s) commitment, but still warranties are 
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neither implied by law nor voluntarily offered. Why should the gov-
ernment offer warranties where private parties do not? It is possible, 
after all, that the private market offers no warranties because per-
formance is hard to measure, in which case we would not wish for the 
government to tread where private parties fear to go. 
 The question reminds us that there is a larger and more familiar 
product-service distinction in play here. In most areas where private 
parties provide services there are normally also no warranties either 
by private contract or by legal imposition.13 Law firms, doctors, pri-
vate grade schools, movie theaters, and amusement parks are not 
known for their warranties. They may face liability in the event of 
malpractice or other tortuous injury, but the failure to perform well 
or to deliver services effectively does not lead to liability. Product 
warranties have grown through contract and through law, but they 
have not appeared with respect to most services. Thus, we might say 
that government failure to warrant is not remarkable, for this is gen-
erally true for services, and we might be skeptical of any attempt to 
foster the use of warranties, even where government services are 
wanting. 
 It is useful at this juncture to understand this product-service 
distinction in the private sector. If we can make sense of the distinc-
tion there, then perhaps it will cast some light on whether product 
warranties are appropriate or not in the public sector. What then is 
the reason for product but not service warranties, generally speak-
ing? One fairly conventional explanation, or distinction, returns us to 
the question of moral hazards. For most products, the warranty gives 
the disappointed consumer a replacement product or the equivalent 
so that, for example, a poor tire is replaced by a new one, but the con-
sumer pays some money in order to be put in the same position as a 
consumer who had a perfect tire with (what have become) somewhat 
worn treads. There is no incentive for the consumer to puncture the 
tire or do anything that triggers the warranty. But with respect to 
most services, the consumer would enjoy the service rendered and 
then claim that he had not done so, in which case there is the moral 
hazard of causing bad service results, or simply the redistributive 
and fraud danger of dishonestly complaining about the service. Thus, 
we think differently of the restaurant patron who complains about 
the food after consuming it than we do of the patron who tastes a 
morsel and objects. Somewhat similarly, where we do see service 
warranties, as in some overnight package delivery services, the war-
ranty does not make the customer better off than if he or she had not 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See La Sara Grain v. First Nat’l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 
1984) (distinguishing services from products). 
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contracted in the first place. Still, it is noteworthy that the govern-
ment never offered a warranty for its postal service.  
 There are counterexamples. The L.L. Bean Company famously 
replaces (even) very used products with new ones if the consumer 
claims to be dissatisfied.14 No public school system could afford to do 
that, and I dare say no automobile manufacturer could create such a 
trusting relationship with its customers. But by and large it is not 
profitable to complain about a product, while it can be quite profit-
able to complain (and collect) regarding services if warranties at-
tached to them. 
 There are other easy product-service distinctions. The use and 
quality of products may be much easier to measure. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to know whether one received good legal advice and more diffi-
cult still to know whether one received services equal to the value of 
a ticket to the theater. But other illustrations would not put the dis-
tinction in such a positive light, and the distinction is often illusory. 
The claim here is that the worst public school in the country is indeed 
one that should be covered by a warranty, and yet if one can show 
that the computer bought last month is the worst one made in the 
country because it is relatively slow, crashes frequently, and often 
needs repair, one does not simply receive money for a new computer. 
 It may also be that we give warranties—or something akin to 
warranties—where there may be personal injuries caused by poor 
products (and services), and most services do not threaten bodily 
harm. But this, like the preceding explanations, raises more ques-
tions than it answers.  
 Perhaps the best available answer to the question of why warran-
ties are associated with products and not with services, or even why 
the Uniform Commercial Code is limited in this way to products 
rather than services, is that markets for services are generally char-
acterized by reputational value and repeat play, and it is these fea-
tures that do the job of encouraging good service.15 Legal warranties 
add complexity and cost, and these may be worthwhile only for rela-
tively durable products. A small piece of this is that even where ser-
vices are long-lived and expensive, the buyer can terminate the rela-
tionship in mid-course. The product market counterpart is one where 
the customer can choose to buy or rent the product, and here we ex-
                                                                                                                      
 14. See L.L. Bean Guarantee, at http://www.llbean.com/customerService/aboutLL 
Bean/guarantee.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
 15. U.C.C. § 2-314.1 (2003) (stating that with the sale of all goods there is an implied 
warranty of merchantability).  
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pect warranties to be associated with the purchased product and not 
the rented one. Indeed, the rental is itself a kind of service.16  
 The market for services is also competitive. This alone does not 
explain the absence of warranties, inasmuch as the market for prod-
ucts is of course also often competitive (though perhaps less so be-
cause of entry barriers, including economies of scale, in manufactur-
ing and distribution). But the point is that services are often associ-
ated not only with repeat play and reputation but also with market 
alternatives for the consumer. Competitive service providers will ad-
vertise their own strengths, and customers can easily experience a 
variety of providers. 
 It goes almost without saying that when the government provides 
services, it is rarely in a competitive market. Many students and 
their families are unable to move back and forth between public and 
private schools, and the same is true for virtually all citizens when it 
comes to welfare services, postal services, crime fighting, national de-
fense, and much more. The best explanation for the product-service 
distinction in the private sector does not therefore carry over to the 
public sector, and I think we can be comfortable imagining and ex-
perimenting with public sector warranties for services. The argument 
is strongest with respect to services regarding which there is a 60/40 
problem so that the political market is unreliable as well. It is for this 
reason that the idea advanced here is limited to circumstances where 
the 60/40 problem seems plausible. 
 There is of course some competition among government units, 
even if a government itself seems to be a monopolistic provider. An 
argument for maintaining the product-service distinction in the pub-
lic sector is, therefore, that the market disciplines governments, for a 
poor provider of education or safety will lose taxpayers (from the los-
ing 40%, perhaps) to other jurisdictions. One reaction to this is defen-
sive and progressive, and it is to point to citizens who are less mobile 
than others or who will simply lose wealth when they sell property to 
buyers who will pay less because of the poor government services. In-
deed, the 60/40 problem may be built around the fact that politicians 
sometimes serve best those who are in danger of exiting or those who 
have been induced through government’s promises to move into a ju-
risdiction.  
 Another reaction is to use intergovernmental competition in 
structuring warranties. A state might set up a citizen warranty that 
took resources from underperforming jurisdictions and moved these 
                                                                                                                      
 16. The state of Texas is the only state to provide for a limited implied warranty for 
services as well as goods. It does so for many of the same reasons mentioned here. Melody 
Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (implying warranty for home repair 
services). 
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resources to high-performance jurisdictions, both by way of reward 
and by way of compensating the successful jurisdictions for the influx 
of needy citizens. Imagine, for example, an educational warranty 
plan that moved students from failing schools to successful ones 
nearby (in the same local jurisdiction or not) and along with each re-
assigned student moved more money than necessary to compensate 
the expanding school. The idea is to make the failing school wish it 
had not lost the student, and the successful school pleased that it 
earned the premium associated with educating one new student. 
 Similarly, a local police force associated with unusually high 
crime rates could lose funds in favor of the state police or county po-
lice who would take on some responsibility for crime fighting in the 
underserved area. The idea is to use competition among governments 
to make these warranty programs more successful and politically at-
tractive. Put differently, an objection to citizen warranties will be 
that poorly served citizens will simply be worse off if money is drawn 
away from their jurisdictions. I have already suggested that one solu-
tion to this problem, if it is that, is to structure the payments so that 
they go to a third party that has bid for the right to receive these 
payments. There need not be a net outflow in such a scheme. A dif-
ferent solution is to funnel the payments to alternative providers of 
services. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The school voucher movement may be an unfortunate way to in-
troduce many citizens and politicians to the idea that markets can 
improve governmental performance, because voucher plans invite the 
rhetoric and reality associated with the problem of students who are 
“left behind” in failing schools.17 Serious competition among public 
schools, or third party payments of the kind introduced here, might 
fare better. 
 More generally, it may be useful to see that in modern times we 
have experienced increased governmental liability in the form of civil 
rights suits, the decline of sovereign immunity, and a variety of legis-
lated government payments, and at the same time we properly credit 
our governments for major accomplishments. But such accomplish-
ments as fighting some wars well, exploring space, developing the 
common law, curing diseases, and so forth are more often than not 
achievements that benefit all citizens, or at least are not susceptible 
to differential delivery of services across the citizenry. Where partial 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) has stated that vouchers would be “a death sen-
tence for public schools struggling to serve disadvantaged students, draining all good stu-
dents out of poor schools.” Casey Lartigue Jr., Helping Kids Succeed in School Is Not 
“Creaming” (Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-19-02.html. 
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public service can be associated with great success, as in the case of 
public universities in the U.S., there is vigorous competition among 
providers—as there is not for much of lower school education, crime 
fighting, and the like. The ideas advanced here have been applied in 
situations where majorities may receive services at the expense of 
minorities, and it is in just such situations that warranties may be 
most useful. These warranties might empower citizens to understand 
just what it is that the government promises to do, and payments to 
third parties (who might or might not pay for the right to receive 
warranty payments) might eliminate the moral hazard that makes 
most government warranty schemes seem foolish. 
 
